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Abstract 
An experimental market was used to investigate whether exchange goods may be susceptible to 
the endowment effect. Previous research (Kahneman et al., 1990) suggested that the endowment 
effect will not be observed in exchange goods. The present study demonstrates that it may be 
observed, but only when traders are uncertain about future exchange prices. It is argued that this is 
a manifestation of loss aversion due to the difficulty of computing the net gains and losses of trade 
when exchange rates are uncertain. 
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1. Introduction 
In the analysis of the bargaining process between potential buyers and sellers 
of commodities, economic theory assumes that preferences are not affected by 
ownership. Thus, when income effects and transaction costs are minimal, the 
willingness to pay for a certain good should equal the willingness to accept. In 
contrast with these assumptions, however, empirical research shows consider- 
able differences between buying and selling prices of consumption goods (see 
e.g., Ortona and Scacciati, 1992: Tietz, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1990). Some 
authors have claimed that these findings may be explained in economic terms. 
For example, as argued by Knez et al. (1985), strategic onsiderations may 
induce buyers to understate, and sellers to overstate their true values. In order to 
assess whether the observed isparity between buying and selling prices may be 
due to something other than strategic pricing, one should investigate situations 
in which buyers and sellers cannot influence the actual trading price with their 
stated value, a condition we meet in the present study. Even in these circum- 
stances, however, disparities between buying and selling prices have been 
demonstrated (Kahneman et al., 1990). 
The finding that people demand more money as compensation for giving up 
an object than they are willing to pay in order to obtain the same object is 
referred to as the 'endowment effect' (Thaler, 1980), and is generally interpreted 
as a manifestation of 'loss aversion', the generalization that losses are weighted 
more heavily than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). A tendency for the 
disutility of losing an object to exceed the utility of gaining the same object 
would indeed explain the disparity between selling and buying prices (see also 
Kahneman et al., 1990; Thaler et al., 1994). This does not mean that the 
endowment effect will be observed in all goods of a positive value, however. As 
Kahneman (1992, p. 301) stated: "loss aversion does not affect all transactions. 
The critical distinction is between goods held for use and goods held for 
exchange." Kahneman distinguished three categories of exchange goods: (1) 
money held for spending: (2) goods held specifically for sale; and (3) goods that 
are only valued because they can be traded ('bargaining chips'). Kahneman 
concluded that "Loss aversion plays little role in routine economic transactions, 
in which sellers and buyers trade goods for money, both of which were held for 
that purpose" (Kahneman, 1992, p. 301). 
Why would exchange goods not be susceptible to the endowment effect? 
What seems crucial is that the value of exchange goods is mainly derived from 
the monetary value obtained by exchange. According to Kahneman (1992), in 
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such situations traders may not consider selling the good as a loss (for which 
they should be compensated) and buying a good as a gain (for which they are 
willing to pay). Instead, they may compute the net  gains and losses associated 
with trading the exchange good (and thus experience no loss aversion). Research 
on the buying and selling prices of bargaining chips seems to corroborate this 
reasoning. In two market experiments, Kahneman et al. (1990, Experiments 1
and 5) investigated buying and selling prices for 'induced-value tokens' (i.e., 
bargaining chips that could be exchanged for a certain value). Corroborating 
Kahneman's conclusion, buying and selling prices did not differ significantly. It
should be noted, however, that in these experiments computing the net gain or 
loss was relatively simple. The exchange value of the bargaining chip was fixed: 
buyers and sellers knew beforehand the exchange value of the bargaining chip. 
Indeed, under such conditions it seems very unlikely that for example sellers 
being offered $2.05 for a bargaining chip with an exchange value of $2.00 will 
experience loss aversion. They may quite readily realize that trading the chip 
will provide them a net gain of $.05. If transaction costs are minimal, sellers 
may be willing to accept any price that equals or exceeds the fixed exchange 
price, whereas buyers may be willing to pay any price equal to or lower than the 
exchange price. 
But what if computing the net gain is not that simple? What if exchange 
prices are not fixed, and traders are not certain how much money they will 
eventually receive for giving up their exchange good? Will they still evaluate 
trades in terms of net gains or losses? In essence, selling a good with an 
uncertain exchange value can be viewed as trading a risky prospect for cash. Do 
people integrate risky prospects and cash payments in order to compute net 
gains or losses? Research on Prospect heory and risky decision making suggests 
they do not: when comparing sure outcomes (e.g., cash) with risky prospects 
people do experience loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984). This 
could mean that an endowment effect in buying and selling prices of exchange 
goods can  be expected when buyers and sellers are uncertain about future 
exchange rates. Under these conditions people may experience loss aversion due 
to the fact that it is more difficult or even impossible to compute net gains of 
trading cash for uncertain exchange values (see also Kahneman et al., 1990). 
In order to investigate the effect of uncertainty of exchange rates on prices, 
we designed an experimental market in which we compared buying and selling 
prices of bargaining chips with a fixed value with buying and selling prices of 
bargaining chips with an uncertain value. In agreement with the findings of 
Kahneman et al. (1990) we expected no endowment effect in the case of a fixed 
monetary value. Reasoning that uncertainty may prevent people from evaluating 
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a trade in terms of net gains/losses, we did expect an endowment effect in the 
case of an uncertain exchange value. 
2. Method 
2.1. Design and participants 
Sixty-six students (35 females; 31 males; mean age: 21 years) of Leiden 
University participated in the experiment. Position (buyer vs. seller) and Uncer- 
tainty (fixed exchange value vs. uncertain exchange value) were manipulated in
a 2 × 2 factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, and 
paid for their participation. 
2.2. Procedure 
The participants were invited to the laboratory in groups of up to eight 
people. Upon arrival, half of the participants received a bargaining chip. The 
bargaining chips were said to represent money since they could be exchanged 
for money at the end of the experiment. In the Fixed Exchange Value condi- 
tions, participants learned they could exchange the chip with the experimenter 
for Dfl. 3.50 (1 Dutch Guilder = $.55 US). In the Uncertain Exchange Value 
conditions, participants learned they could exchange the chip for an amount of 
money between Dfl. 1.75 and Dfl. 5.25, depending on a chance procedure. 
Before exchanging the bargaining chip for money with the experimenter, 
however, participants could trade the bargaining chips among themselves: 
participants owning a chip (the Sellers) could sell this chip to participants not 
owning a chip (the Buyers). The procedure for indicating buying and selling 
prices resembled the procedure used by Kahneman et al. (1990). On a separate 
form, prices were listed from Dfl. 0.25 to Dfl. 6.75 (with Dfl. 0.25 intervals). 
Sellers were requested to indicate for each price whether or not they would sell 
at that price. Buyers indicated for each price whether or not they would buy at 
that price. The experimenter would randomly select a price on this form, thus 
establishing the 'market price' for the chip. This procedure was intended to 
prevent participants from misstating their true values. It was stressed that if they 
had indicated that they were willing to buy/sell  at this randomly selected 
'market price', they had to stick to their stated intention. With this procedure we 
also attempted to diminish the possible effect of demand characteristics, which 
may affect choice behavior in experimental markets. After the experimenter 
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collected the forms, participants estimated the value of the bargaining chip. At 
this point the experiment was ended. Participants were debriefed and all 
received Dfl. 5.00. All participants agreed to this procedure. 
3. Results 
3.1. Offers 
A 2 X 2 ANOVA on the offers (i.e., the selling price of the sellers and the 
buying price of the buyers) revealed a Position main effect (F(1 ,62)= 12.8, 
p < 0.001), indicating an endowment effect: The selling price of the sellers 
(mean = Dfl. 3.76) exceeded the buying price of the buyers (mean = Dfl. 3.05). 
As predicted, this main effect was qualified by a significant Position X 
Uncertainty interaction (F(1,62) = 4.1, p < 0.05). Corroborating the findings of 
Kahneman et al. (1990), no significant endowment effect was observed when 
the value of the exchange good was fixed (F(1 ,62)= 1.2, p < 0.3; overall 
mean = Dfl. 3.40; mean for sellers = Dfl. 3.56; mean for buyers = Dfl. 3.25). In 
agreement with our hypothesis, in the case of an uncertain exchange rate, 
however, the selling price (mean = Dfl. 3.97) significantly exceeded the buying 
price (mean = Dfl. 2.87; F(1,62) = 15.7, p < 0.0001). These results indicate 
that exchange goods may, like consumption goods, be susceptible to the 
endowment effect, provided that exchange rates are uncertain. 
3.2. Expected exchange value 
Research in experimental markets suggests that value judgments and prices 
may be affected by uncertainty (for an excellent overview on this subject see 
Camerer, 1992). In order to assess whether estimates of the exchange value were 
affected by ownership and/or uncertainty, we asked participants to indicate the 
monetary value they expected to receive for the bargaining chip (i.e., the value 
for which it could eventually be exchanged with the experimenter). Not surpris- 
ingly, in the fixed value conditions, both buyers and sellers (correctly) estimated 
the exchange value to be Dfl. 3.50. Of course we were more interested in the 
estimates of buyers and sellers in the case of the uncertain exchange value. In 
the Uncertain Exchange Value conditions buyers' and sellers' estimates did not 
significantly differ from Dfl. 3.50 (mean for buyers = Dfl. 3.34; t (16)= 0.9, 
p < 0.4; mean for sellers = Dfl. 3.27; t(15) = 1.5, p < 0.2). More interestingly, 
these results indicate that even in these Uncertain Exchange Value conditions 
buyers and sellers did not differ in their estimates (t(31) = 0.3, p < 0.8). 
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Thus, uncertainty of exchange rates did affect buying and selling prices (i.e., 
uncertain exchange rates resulted in an endowment effect), but did not affect the 
value estimates of buyers and sellers. This is in line with the suggestion that the 
endowment effect is primarily the result of loss aversion: sellers did not expect a 
higher exchange value than buyers, they just demanded more money for giving 
it up than buyers were willing to pay. 
4. Conclusions 
Taken together, the results of the present study confirm the proposition (cf. 
Thaler, 1980; Thaler et al., 1994; Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1990) that 
the endowment effect is a result of loss aversion. While corroborating this 
proposition, the data do qualify Kahneman's (1992) conclusion that exchange 
goods are not susceptible to the endowment effect. Our interpretation of the data 
is that an endowment effect may be observed in exchange goods when exchange 
rates are uncertain, because people are less likely or able to compute the net 
gains (cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). 
One other thing that uncertainty may do is elicit a motivation to avoid regret. 
Could this explain the results of our present study? One of the basic assumptions 
of the Loomes and Sugden (1982) Regret theory is that people may anticipate 
feelings of regret. This notion on its own falls short of explaining the endow- 
ment effect, however. Anticipation of regret does not necessarily imply an 
unwillingness to buy or sell. People may also experience regret after not buying 
or not selling. For example, in our experiment people may eventually regret 
buying a chip for Dfl. 3.50 when the exchange rate turns out to be only Dfl. 
1.75. They may also regret not  buying a chip for Dfl. 3.50 when the exchange 
rate turns out to be Dfl. 5.25. Similarly, people may not only regret selling a 
chip for Dfl. 3.50 when the exchange rate turns out to be Dfl. 5.25, they may 
also regret not  selling a chip for Dfl. 3.50 when the exchange rate is Dfl. 1.75. 
It is also appropriate to note that we do not claim that all disparities between 
buying and selling prices are necessarily the result of loss aversion. Beggan 
(1992) argued that people may overvalue objects they own in order to maintain a 
positive self-image. In agreement with this interpretation, he demonstrated that 
in many situations ownership may produce greater liking for an owned object. In 
a similar vein, Ortona and Scacciati (1992) argued that the endowment effect 
may be related to an 'instinctive bias' due to ownership. These interpretations 
would imply a general overvaluation of objects owned, whereas we did not 
observe an endowment effect in the case of fixed exchange rates. General 
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overvaluation of objects owned may be more prevalent in the case of consumer 
goods than in the case of exchange goods, however. Beggan's (1992) analysis of 
the mere ownership effect presupposes that "possessions are objects associated 
with the self" (Beggan, 1992, p. 229). In our experiment (i.e., a study on 
exchange goods) participants may not have experienced such an association 
because they realized that at the end of the experiment the bargaining chips 
would be exchanged for money. 
Although the main focus of our study was on the question whether an 
endowment effect may be observed in the trade of exchange goods, it may be 
worthwhile to elaborate on the possible implications for research on consump- 
tion goods. The bulk of the research on the endowment effect has been on 
consumption goods (e.g., mugs, chocolate bars) in situations where it may be 
difficult to compute the net gains and losses of trade. If someone wants to buy 
your chocolate bar you may perceive giving up the chocolate bar as a loss. But 
what would happen if someone offered you one and a half chocolate bars for 
your chocolate bar? In this situation it is easy to compute the net gains of trade 
(you would gain half a chocolate bar), and you would probably not be 
susceptible to the endowment effect. This tentative example suggests that to 
predict whether sellers and buyers will experience loss aversion, research should 
not only focus on what is being traded (e.g., exchange goods or consumption 
goods). Instead, research should also focus on what is being traded for what. It 
may be worthwhile to relate these insights to the characteristics approach of 
Lancaster (1971). In his theory of consumer demand Lancaster viewed goods as 
bundles of characteristics. One of the propositions of this theory is that goods 
will be more substitutable the more characteristics they have in common. In a 
similar vein, we suggest that people will be less subject o the endowment effect 
the more characteristics the objects traded have in common; in such situations it 
may be more easy to compute the net gains and losses of trade. It seems 
appropriate to investigate the relation between substitutability and the endow- 
ment effect in future research by comparing the willingness to trade for goods 
varying in the number of common characteristics. 
References 
Beggan, J.K.. 1992. On the social nature of nonsocial perception: The mere ownership effect. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 62, 229-237. 
Camerer, C., 1992. The rationality of prices and volume in experimental markets. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 51,237-272. 
Kahneman, D., 1992. Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 51, 296-312. 
524 E. van Dijk, D. L,an Knippenberg / Journal of Economic Psychology 17 (1996) 517-524 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler, 1990. Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the 
Coase-theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98, 1325-1348. 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, 1979. Prospect heory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 
263-291. 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, 1984. Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist 39, 341-350. 
Knez, M, V.L. Smith and A.W. Williams, 1985. Individual rationality, market rationality, and value 
estimation. American Economic Review 75, 397-402. 
Lancaster, K. J., 1971. Consumer demand: A new approach. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Loomes, G. and R. Sugden, 1982. Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. 
Economic Journal 92, 805-824. 
Ortona, G. and F. Scacciati, 1992. New experiments on the endowment effect. Journal of Economic 
Psychology 13, 277-296. 
Thaler, R., 1980. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 1, 39-60. 
Thaler, R., D. Kahneman and J.L. Knetsch, 1994. 'The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias'. 
In: R. Thaler (Ed.), The Winners's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life (pp. 63-78). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tietz, R., 1992. "An endowment effect in market experiments?" In: S.E.G. Lea, P. Webley, and B.M. Young 
(Eds.), New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application (pp. 99-121). 
Aldershot: Elgar. 
